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ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS. By Joseph 
Parker Witherspoon. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1968. 
Pp. viii, 581. $10. 
Nearly three decades have passed since June 25, 1941, the birth 
date of the administrative law of civil rights. On that day President 
Roosevelt, by executive order, forbade discrimination on the basis 
of race, creed, or national origin by federal agencies or by defense 
industries, and established a Committee on Fair Employment Prac-
tice to implement his order.1 Since 1941 there has been a continuous 
expansion of administrative activity in this area. We have now had 
almost thirty years to observe the extension of coverage of civil 
rights laws and the gradual development of more and more power-
ful enforcement devices. Provisions against discrimination have en-
tered into the legal order at all levels--in federal law, in federal 
administrative regulations, in the laws of thirty-seven states and 
dozens of local communities, in scores of labor contracts, and in the 
rules and regulations of a great variety of public and private insti-
tutions. Employment, education, public accommodations, and hous-
ing have come under the purview of the administrative law of civil 
rights. As coverage has increased, so have the variety and strength of 
formal administrative powers. Originally armed with only moral 
force, agencies have gradually been granted both interlocutory and 
permanent enforcement tools. 
What are the lessons of these thirty years? Professor Witherspoon 
seeks to summarize and capture them in a set of proposed model 
statutes designed to embody both the proved features of past civil 
rights law and remedies for known defects. Witherspoon under-
stands that the principal weakness of most of the administrative ac-
tivity of the past has been virtually exclusive reliance on the com-
plaints of aggrieved individuals as the raw material for enforcement 
programs. This strategy, which I have elsewhere christened the 
"private-law approach"2 fails to attack patterns of discrimination. 
Rather, the energies of administrative agencies are dissipated in the 
conciliation of an endless stream of relatively trivial incidents--ar-
bitrations of misunderstandings, explanations of unintended sleights, 
and routine surveillance of employment forms and applications. 
These following provisions contain the thrust of Witherspoon's 
legislative proposals: 
1. Exec. Order No. 9,!!46, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943 Comp.). 
2. L. MAYHEW, LAW 8e EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (1968). 
[ 1441] 
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Section 502. Basic functions of the Commission. (a) The Com-
mission shall perform the following basic functions: 
(3) negotiating with governing bodies and agencies of political 
subdivisions, with state agencies, and with persons and organizations 
having statewide operations for the taking of action by them to im-
prove opportunities available to minority and other disadvantaged 
groups and utilizing of inspections, surveys, private conferences, 
public hearings, reports, and enforcement actions to assure the 
effectiveness of negotiation; 
(4) processing individual complaints ... 
(5) undertaking various types of constructive action designed to 
eliminate the causes of intergroup-relations problems . . . that re-
sult from the continued existence of these problems . . . . 
(b) It is the sense of the Legislature that the processing of indi-
vidual complaints should be regulated as far as possible to local sec-
tions and that the negotiation and constructive-action functions of 
the Commission should receive the greatest emphasis in its adminis-
tration of the Act. [Pp. 315-16.J 
It is my unhappy duty to report that Witherspoon's analysis is 
both indubitably correct and profoundly shallow: correct because 
he knows the weaknesses of the traditional approach and the ap-
propriate direction of future movement, but shallow because he 
does not systematically found his argument for change on a per-
suasive analysis of the failures of civil rights law in the social struc-
ture of American society and in the organization of community life. 
In part, this weakness of Professor Witherspoon's work results from 
limitations on his sources of data. He has read a large number of 
statutes, annual reports of commissions, and secondary sources-the 
kind of literature one can find in law libraries or receive in the 
mail. That he accomplished anything with such materials is a 
testimony to his insight and diligence because there is a noticeable 
lack of trustworthy and substantial documentation in either the self-
serving statements of administrative officials about their own work 
or the pious pronunciamentos of liberals who do not want to believe 
that thirty years' investment in the administrative implementation 
of civil rights has come to nought, or at least to a dead end. All too 
often he betrays the "biased sources of his work, to the detriment of 
his own arguments. At one point he falls into the habit of the 
annual-report writer and describes a "typical" case of alleged dis-
crimination in employment: A qualified Negro electrician, who was 
refused employment by a large electric company in Pittsburgh, 
complained to the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations. 
Intensive investigation revealed discriminatory practices. The Com-
mission corrected them and secured employment for the com-
plainant (p. 112). Such an incident is not only atypical, it is ex-
tremely rare. My own research indicates that a case involving a 
May 1969] Recent Books 1443 
complaint filed by a dismissed Negro elevator operator, who was 
replaced by another Negro elevator operator in a building in which 
all the elevator operators were Negro, is as "typical" as the usual 
examples given in annual reports. To accept incorrectly the Pitts-
burgh Commission's designation of the typical case is to undermine 
the author's own argument that complaints are not effective in-
struments of law enforcement. Similarly, although Witherspoon 
recognizes that commissions do not receive many useful complaints 
(pp. 158-59), he is willing to accept the common argument that the 
dismissal of a high percentage of complaints betrays a weakness in 
commission procedures (p. 177). The main reason for a high level 
of dismissed complaints is that a large proportion are ill founded. 
The dismissals do not mean that there is no discrimination, but they 
do indicate that private complaints do not provide an effective 
means of attacking it. More generally, in assessing performance, 
Witherspoon does not hesitate to cite comparative statistics from 
various administrative bodies despite the fact that the commissions 
generally use unrevealing or deceptive categories of figures which 
cannot be compared. 
Similar caveats must be entered against Witherspoon's faith that 
more aggressive policies of enforcement directed against patterns of 
discrimination will be more successful. Here he relies on the reputa-
tion and. testimony of commissions that are known to have at-
tempted strategic attacks on whole industries or spheres of employ-
ment. The New York State Commission is considered to be quite 
vigorous and Witherspoon cites its experience as an example of the 
relative success of militant enforcement, relying on its own reports 
and a private study by Norgren and Hill3 (p. 119). However, con-
fronted with adverse criticism of the New York Commission by 
civil rights groups, he retreats and concludes that they have not 
moved very far beyond the case method (p. 127). The Philadelphia 
Commission emerges as an even greater hero, for it has in fact 
engaged in a broad program of inspection, reporting, and negotia-
tion on an industry-wide basis (pp. 202-05). He accepts its testimony 
of its mvn success; to me it is self-serving. Neither the Philadelphia 
Commission, nor any of the other supposedly aggressive commissions 
-New York State, Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, New York City-have 
been subjected to a rigorous, independent review by a professional 
investigator. In the absence of an audit by a qualified expert who 
has access to the record and to the industries in question, the verdict 
should be that success has not been proved. 
Conversely, the Massachusetts Commission emerges as a goat, 
despite the fact that, were evidence of the quality adduced by Nor-
3. P. NoRGREN &: s. HILL, Tow.ARD FAIR EMPLOYMENT (1964). 
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gren and Hill accepted, Massachusetts has a fine record.4 The 
Massachusetts Commission is knmvn to be weak because it has been 
subjected to close examination by an independent investigator; the 
Massachusetts Governor's Commission had access to the report of 
the examination and it, in turn, issued a report which was available 
to Professor Witherspoon. 5 
So far my criticism has been superficial; it relates to the quality 
of the evidence and to the confused picture that necessarily emerges 
when an investigator relies primarily on existing public documents. 
The problems are deeper. In relying on such documents, one can 
achieve no more than a rare glimpse of the social context in which 
agencies operate or the hard social realities that they must face. If 
the Philadelphia Commission has been more militant, what has 
allowed the Commission to get away with it? If it has successfully 
changed patterns of employment in whole industries, how, precisely, 
did it accomplish that objective? From time to time Witherspoon 
has glittering insights into the social character of discrimination, the 
structured exclusion of minority groups from the mainstream of 
community life, and the political difficulties of commissions, but he 
does not thoroughly and consistently base his analysis on a solid 
appreciation of those facts of life. 
The fundamental obstacle to the elimination of discrimination 
is de facto segregation in all its complicated, subtle, and unexpected 
forms. Early in the history of the administrative implementation of 
civil rights, the problem was seen as one of eliminating overt, de-
liberate policies of discrimination. That form has by no means been 
destroyed, but there is growing recognition that even if racist ex-
clusion is destroyed, the actual structure of minority group partici-
pation will not necessarily change. As long as patterns of housing 
segregation exist, as long as there is segregation in voluntary associa-
tions, as long as minority groups are cut off from the networks of 
communication in the community-in short, as long as segregation 
remains in any area of life-it will be reproduced in other areas of 
life, because the various spheres of human activity are linked to each 
other, embedded in a common social structure. Witherspoon recog-
nizes that patterns of de facto segregation require affirmative action 
in order to change these social realities. However, he fails to follow 
the logic of this position to its formidable conclusions. A unified 
account of de facto segregation would appreciate that there is an 
intimate affinity between de facto segregation and the failure of the 
current policy of enforcing equality of opportunity through indi-
4. See, e.g., the statistics presented in MAsSACHUSETIS COMMISSION AGAINST DIS• 
CRIMINATION, 1952 ANNUAL REPORT 9-10. 
5. SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION To REVIEW THE FuNCTIONS AND POUCIES OF THE MAS• 
SACHUSETIS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, REPORT (1964). 
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vidual complaints. Both result from the same cause. Minority groups 
are so excluded from the mainstream of participation in social life 
that de facto segregation is everywhere-even, ironically, in the 
patterns of complaints against discrimination. A passive approach to 
the administrative implementation of civil rights has the same weak-
ness as a passive approach to the elimination of discrimination 
within any institution, be it a business firm, an educational facility, 
or any other association. All require the same remedy, the active 
construction of institutions of incorporation-institutions designed 
to reach out and include minority groups in their activities. 
Institutions of incorporation are more easily recommended than 
constructed. Here Professor Witherspoon's plans are sketchy indeed. 
He suggests that we could write a statute calling for a more active 
approach, but he does not tell us how we could make it work. He 
merely tells us that it has worked in Philadelphia. Perhaps it is 
asking too much to demand practical advice from a book devoted 
primarily to legal analysis; the technical side of negotiating change 
is beyond the scope of purely legal problems. The flaw in that de-
fense is that the two are not separable: purely legal problems may 
pose the most serious obstacle to a more active approach. Is it pos-
sible that, having spent the better part of thirty years establishing 
nondiscrimination clauses in the legal order at every level, we will 
now find _that these clauses obstruct the attempt to include minority 
groups in all phases of American life? There is a tension between 
the idea of nondiscrimination, in the sense of passive color blind-
ness, and active incorporation, in the sense of deliberately con-
structing avenues of access to opportunity. The latter implies not 
color blindness but attention to color, even, in some cases, implicit 
or explicit discrimination against majority groups. The tension leads 
to legal problems which began to fester in the fifties when an agree-
ment between Negro groups and New York breweries to increase 
the employment of Negroes by working toward a quota of black 
workers earned the displeasure of the state commission against dis-
crimination. 6 Recently the federal Office of Education warned An-
tioch College that it must desegregate its black studies program or 
face loss of federal funds.7 More generally, many firms have used 
state laws against discrimination as weapons against the presidential 
equal opportunities programs that demand compliance reporting. 
"How can we tell you how many minority group members we em-
ploy when state law tells us we must be color-blind?" Witherspoon's 
model civil rights act would take care of this particular problem, but 
not the generic problem as- it has become manifest in recent years. 
6. STATE OF N.Y. INTERDEPARTMENAL COM?-UTJ:EE ON Low INCOMES, DISCRIMINATION 
AND Low INCOMES (1959). 
7. Z1 CoNG. Q. 367 (March 14, 1969). 
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Indeed, if his proposed reforms are carried out, the latent tensions 
in the two approaches will become progressively salient. Does With-
erspoon's model act require the following amendment? 
Nothing in this act may be construed to forbid the development or 
implementation of any reasonable program designed to increase 
economic and cultural opportunities for the members of any racial 
or ethnic group that suffers from unreasonable deprivations of op-
portunity. 
Would such an amendment be constitutional? At one point 
Witherspoon does suggest a line of argument that might be used 
to justify an explicit permissive clause of this sort. His proposed 
statutes forbid not just discrimination but "certain unreasonable 
practices and policies; including discrimination" (p. 308). At various 
points discrimination is defined as direct or indirect exclusion. 
Witherspoon apparently believes that the use of the broad concept 
"unreasonable practice" would permit the expansion of laws against 
discrimination to cover the variety of practices that in fact restrict 
opportunity. 
The principle to be established should be one prohibiting any 
method of conducting a business, profession, or government agency 
that unreasonably restricts a person of any race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, or age in obtaining employment, housing, home 
financing, public accommodations, education, or otherwise partici-
pating in any phases of community life. [P. 206.] 
That is an interesting idea but is too limited. What would 
Witherspoon's proposed statutes permit businesses, professions, and 
government agencies to do? How far will it allow organizations to 
go in establishing new forms of opportunity? That the problem 
has not been seriously considered is clear from the fact that the 
proposed new acts contain some inappropriate vestiges of the civil 
rights laws of the past and present. Section 825 of the model state act 
provides that it is unlawful for any employer prior to employment 
to make inquiry concerning the race or ethnic origin of any appli-
cant for employment. Such provisions are common in the present 
civil rights laws, but how can an employer actively seek to employ 
minority group members and still conform to this edict (p. 341)? 
One of the proposed statutory definitions of discrimination, 
despite its breadth (or perhaps because of it), raises many questions: 
Section 701. Definitions . ... 
(6) "Discrimination" means any direct or indirect exclusion, dis-
tinction, segregation, 'limitation, refusal, denial, or any other differ-
entiation or preference in the treatment of a person or persons on 
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account of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, age, sex, 
or economic status .... [Pp. 323-24.] 
Under that standard, would a training program designed to improve 
opportunities for Negroes be a case of segregation? Would it indi-
rectly discriminate against potential Caucasian trainees? 
More aggressive enforcement of the traditional conceptions of 
equal opportunity will not meet the new and emergent demands 
of minority groups. And in a very profound sense, civil rights law 
has always been oriented to trying to meet demands-to the recon-
ciliation of groups. Discrimination has not been treated as a crime, 
as a violation of the moral order; past civil rights laws have con-
tained penalties not for violating the law but for violating the orders 
of civil rights commissions. It is as if a victim of robbery could do 
no more than file a complaint with an antirobbery commission. 
The commission would then conciliate the claim, attempt to achieve 
reparations, and order the robber to cease his life of crime. Only 
after violating the cease-and-desist order could the robber be subject 
to criminal sanctions. Witherspoon retains this conception of dis-
crimination in his proposed legislation. 
Civil rights law has to a large extent been patterned on labor 
law, specifically the National Labor Relations Act. The emphasis is 
on negotiation, conciliation, and standards of fairness. If this is to be 
the approach, then it would seem that the law must recognize and 
cope with the actual character of the demands that are being pressed. 
Members of the new generation of blacks do not want their blackness 
denied; for them, to be treated universalistically is to be denied 
identity, and, more important, to be denied power. They do not 
want color-blind treatment, they want a piece of the action. Wither-
spoon fails to appreciate the significance of this movement from 
color blindness to color consciousness. 
Finally, I should enter a word on Witherspoon's faith in local-
ism in the implementation of civil rights (pp. 215-87). A great deal 
of Witherspoon's most detailed analysis concerns problems in the 
Southwest (Austin, Texas, in particular). As to conditions and fore-
casts for this region I bow to Professor Witherspoon's superior ex-
pertise. At the same time, I cannot accept on faith his basic premise 
that legal action in the local community provides a superior vantage 
point for attacking problems of discrimination. It is true that one 
can argue sociologically that the production of change requires ac-
tion at the grass roots. But one can also argue that it is local politics 
which is most thoroughly controlled by the least responsible inter-
ests in our political system, and that a locally based commission is 
the most corruptible. Witherspoon argues that the greater militancy 
of such local commissions as those in New York City, Philadelphia, 
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Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Detroit is a result of the fact that they are 
locally based. I would argue that local commissions are more ag-
gressive because they entered the arena at a later point in time. 
The pioneering action took place at the state level, but the state 
commissions were initially interested in achieving recognition of 
their legitimacy, and thus they became circumscribed by relatively 
conservative enforcement policies. Local commissions moved into 
the political niche created by the rise of support for militant action 
because the state commissions were unable to transcend their history. 
Witherspoon's arguments as to what would constitute constructive 
action at the local level are excellent, but again he has failed to 
ground his general analysis on persuasive appeals to the facts of the 
social order-in this case the facts of power. 
Professor Witherspoon's work is well worth careful study. His 
proposed statutes should be examined by all legislators and groups 
who seek to improve civil rights legislation. That his work and his 
proposals can be seriously questioned is merely an inescapable con-
sequence of the tempo of social change. In intellectual activity we 
must stop from time to time to sort out our impressions and to de-
vise new schemes to account for new facts. While we stop to think, 
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